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ARTICLES
NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF
SERVICE CONTRACTS AND THE
ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE*
TIMOTHY L. BERTSCHY**
INTRODUCTION

In its enigmatic opinion in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
National Tank Co. ,' the Supreme Court of Illinois made a blan2
ket declaration that economic loss was not recoverable in tort.
The Moorman decision has been criticized for the absoluteness
of such a statement and it is readily apparent that economic loss
is in fact recoverable under certain circumstances in tort.3 Nevertheless, the concept of barring the recovery of economic loss
in tort is generally a sensible one.
One of the perplexing problems unresolved in Moorman is
the application of its holding to service contracts. In theory, the
doctrine of economic loss clearly applies. 4 Yet, in practice,
courts have been reluctant to invoke the doctrine to avoid tort
liability. This article reviews the differing standards permitting
tort recovery for negligent performance of service contracts and
the meaning of the economic loss doctrine. It then evaluates the
propriety of applying the economic loss doctrine to service con* This article is an expansion of an article that first appeared in the
Illinois Bar Journal. Bertschy, The Economic Loss Doctrine in Illinois After
Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J. 346 (1983).
** Partner in the law firm of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria,
Illinois (practice primarily specialized in the field of commercial litigation).
J.D., National Law Center, George Washington University, Washington,
D.C., 1977. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ms. Julie Comfort and Ms. Mary Lavallee for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
2. Id. at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 450-51.
3. See Bertschy, The Economic Loss Doctrine in Illinois After Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J. 346, 348-52 (1983).
4. The theoretical background of the economic loss doctrine, see infra

text accompanying notes 52-92, is not premised upon the nature of the item
to which loss is suffered. Instead, it is based upon the nature of the undertaking between the parties in suit or their predecessors. Thus, Moorman,
although arising in a product sales context, also applies theoretically to the
sale of services.
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tracts, and analyzes the implication of the economic loss doctrine upon tort recovery for negligent performance of service
contracts.
THE CONTRACT-TORT OVERLAP

Traditionally, and in theory, the line between contract law
and tort law is distinct. Contract law applies to those obligations
which are voluntarily undertaken between parties and is
grounded in the contracting parties' mutual expectations. Tort
law, on the other hand, imposes a social responsibility regardless of undertaking. It imports by law a required standard of
conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk.
A failure to conform to the prescribed standard, and a resulting
injury, engenders liability even absent contract. Whether a tort
duty should be imposed is determined by reference to foreseeability, the likelihood of injury, the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury and5 the
consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant.
The measure of damages between the two causes of action
is also distinct. Damages for contractual breach encompass the
loss directly resulting from the breach and extend to those
losses reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting.6 Contractual damages can be liquidated or
5. Lance v. Senior, 36 Il. 2d 516, 518, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1967) (host's
knowledge of guest's hemophiliac condition not enough to impose tort
duty). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at
326-27 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser recognizes the difficulty of stating an adequate rule as to when a tort duty exists. In addition to the factors described
herein, the convenience of administration, the policy of preventing future
injuries, and moral blame and sometimes considered. Moreover,
"[c Ihanging social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties." Id. at 327. Prosser concludes that "[nIo better general statement can
be made, than that courts will find a duty where ... reasonable men would
recognize it and agree that it exists." Id.
6. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341,156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (loss of profits recovered when party was informed of need for no delay). See also Bartinikas v. Clarklift of Chicago North, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 959, 962 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(loss of investment opportunities held not to be in contemplation of parties); Rivenbark v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 37 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539, 346 N.E.2d
494, 497 (1976) (loss of profits recoverable if reasonably ascertainable). Numerous Illinois cases identify the measure of damages for breach of contract as that amount needed to put the parties in the same position as they
would have been if the contract had been performed. See, e.g., Crum v.
Krol, 99 Ill. App. 3d 651, 663, 425 N.E.2d 1081, 1089-90 (1981) (recovery permitted for increase in value of land in breach of contract action). This statement is ultimately limited, however, by Hadley. See Rivenbark v. Finis P.
Ernest, Inc., 37 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539, 346 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1976) (damages must
App. 527, 529be within contemplation of parties); Pluard v. Gerrity, 162 Ml1.
30 (1911) (damages must be ascertainable); Illinois Smelting & Ref. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 146 Ill. App. 163, 167 (1909) (loss of profits not recoverable). See also 15 ILL. L. & PRAc. Damages § 145 (1968).
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limited. 7 In tort, damages extend to all losses proximately resulting from the breach of duty. 8 Punitive damages may be recovered for egregious behavior.9 The concept of liquidated or
limited damages is inapposite in tort recovery or, where apposite, generally unenforceable. Moreover, the period statutorily
specified and the means of calculating the limitations period for
contract and tort are different. 10
While remaining separate causes of action, contract and tort
have occasion to overlap and apply dually to certain factual situations. Four relationships in particular have been recognized as
giving rise to both contract and tort implications: (1) carrier/passenger; (2) innkeeper/guest; (3) business invitor/invitee; and (4) one who voluntarily takes custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his
normal opportunities for protection." The underlying relationship in each of these circumstances originates in contract, thus,
7. See, e.g., Curtin v. Ogborn, 75 Ill. App. 3d 549, 394 N.E.2d 593 (1979).
In Curtin, the court noted that a liquidated damages provision will be enforced when (1) the parties so intended, (2) the amount was reasonable at
the time of contracting, (3) the amount stated in the provision bears some
relation to the actual damage, and (4) the actual damages would be difficult
to prove. Id. at 554-55, 394 N.E.2d at 598. But see Arduini v. Board of Educ.,
Pontiac Tp. High Sch., 93 Ill.
App. 3d 925, 931, 418 N.E.2d 104, 108 (1981) (liquidated damage clause is unenforceable if it is a penalty), rev'd on other
grounds 92 Ill. 2d 197, 441 N.E.2d 73 (1982).
8. For a discussion of proximate cause, see W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
at ch. 7. One commentator has distinguished tort and contract damages by
noting that "[tIhe rule applicable in actions for breach of contract, that the
damages recoverable are limited to those which may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties, is generally
deemed not to be applicable in tort actions, although there are some holdings to the contrary." 22 Am.JUR. 2D Damages § 80, at 115 (1965). See also
id. at § 18 (discussing distinctions between tort and contract damages).
9. The particular wording of the standard, however, may differ from
state to state. In Illinois, for example, punitive damages may be recovered
when torts are committed with "fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or
oppression, or when the defendant acts wilfully, or with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others." Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.
2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978) (punitive damages
recovered in action for retaliatory discharge).
10. The statutes of limitation in Illinois are five and ten years for oral
and written contracts, respectively, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 13-205, 13-206
(1981), and four years for breach of any contract for sale. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
26, § 2-725 (1981). The tort standard varies from one year (slander) upwards
and is often tolled by a discovery rule. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-201
(1981). See generally 25 ILL. LAw & PRAC., Limitations (1965).
11. See Burks v. Madyun, 105 111. App. 3d 917, 435 N.E.2d 185 (1982).
Burks observed that the existence of a duty, "the legal obligation imposed
upon one for the benefit of another," is a question of law to be determined
by the court. Id. at 919, 435 N.E.2d at 188. In making this determination,
Burks found, Illinois courts have relied upon the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 314(A) (1965) which identified these four special relations as occasions giving rise to a duty to protect another. Burks, 105 Ill.
App. 3d at 91920, 435 N.E.2d at 188.
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the viability of contractual remedies. Each relationship, however, is also of special social significance and thereby falls
within the orbit of those factors defining the boundaries of tort,
hence, the imposition of tort liability. These four relationships
clearly do not encompass the entirety of the contract-tort overlap; the overlap includes any contractual relation to which such
special social significance attaches because of the nature of the
contract or the special circumstances which arise during the
2
performance of the contract.'
The contract-tort overlap has special implications respecting service contracts. In the attorney/client, physician/patient,
accountant/client and architect/client relationships, it has been
accepted that both theories of recovery are potentially applicable to instances of malpractice. 13 The professional standing and
12. The most conservative approach to imposing tort liability for breach
of contract, which includes only those "special socially significant cases," is
also encompassed within the more liberal approaches. See infra notes 17-20
and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 111. 2d 326, 178
N.E.2d 303 (1961) (patient's mother brought breach of contract and malpractice action against doctor). In Zostautas, the court observed:
In the development of the law, the relationship of physician and patient
has given rise to actions of a hybrid nature ... sounding in tort or in
contract ... and both theories are often advanced in alternative counts,
as in the instant case ....
Although these actions of malpractice in breach of contract may arise
out of the same transaction, they are distinct as to theory, proof and
damages ....
Actions in contract may be based upon an express
promise by the physician ... or may be based upon the implied obligation arising out of the defendant's employment as a physician to use
proper skill and care ... or to furnish proper medical aid ....
In such
actions, liability is predicated on the failure to perform an agreed undertaking rather than upon negligence, and the damages are restricted
to the payments made, the expenditure for nurses and medicines, or
"other damages that flow from the breach thereof" . . . and do not include the patient's pain and suffering as in malpractice actions ....
Id. at 328-29, 178 N.E.2d at 304-05. See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324 (1957)
(accountant liability); Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 396 (1979) (accountant's malpractice liability).
With respect to architects, it has been observed:
Architects and engineers hold themselves out as competent to produce
work requiring: (a) skill in the preparation of plans, drawings or designs suitable for the particular work to be executed; (b) knowledge of
the materials to be used and the proper application for use;
(c) knowledge of construction methods and procedures. Presumably, if
the architect or engineer fails to use reasonable care to produce a satisfactory structure, he may be sued either for an implied term of his contract or in negligence. ...
Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV.
711 (1959), quoted in St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925,
943, 316 N.E.2d 51, 64 (1974).
For the implications of legal malpractice, see Christison v. Jones, 83 Ill.
App. 3d 334, 405 N.E.2d 8 (1980). In Christison, the court held that a legal
malpractice action was of a hybrid nature, more like a tort, and, therefore,
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the trust and confidence reposed in the defendant, as well as the
professional training and expertise of the defendant, draw such
cases within tort. Outside of such professional relations, however, the law is tangled and ambiguous with respect to tort responsibilities engendered by a contractual relationship.
Although a review of the cases throughout the country
reveals a continuum of different rules and applications in this
area, it is helpful for purposes of discussion to group the cases
into three basic categories. The first category of cases permits a
tort recovery only where a traditional tort analysis finds a positive tort duty existing under the circumstances. 14 Second are
was not assignable. Id. at 336-37, 405 N.E.2d at 9-10. Accordingly, the bankruptcy trustee did not become possessed of the debtor's cause of action
against his attorney for malpractice. Christison did not explicitly consider,
however, whether a cause of action could be brought against an attorney for
breach of contract; it would seem that there are circumstances where the
failure of an attorney to perform could clearly give rise to a cause of action
for breach of contract, such as the failure of an attorney to prepare a proper
will or deed.
14. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Continental Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.
1981) (only if there is a duty independent of the contract can there be a
cause of action in tort); Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 718 (conduct that is a mere breach of contract is
not actionable in tort), reh. denied, 323 U.S. 813 (1944); Meyer v. Bell &
Howell Co., 453 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (complaint must state a claim
which would amount to an independent, willful tort to allow punitive damages); Iron Mtn. Sec. Storage v. Am. Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (no "recovery for breach of implied contractual duty of good faith
...where breach occurred in ordinary commercial contract" setting); Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.
Fla. 1976) (recovery of punitive damages arising out of contract breach only
allowed where acts constitute independent tort); Pendleton v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. La. 1970) (claimant must show breach of
legal duty independent of contractual duties); Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (claim in tort
allowed only if facts constituting breach of contract also establish independent breach of legal duty); Felder v. Great American Ins. Co., 260 F.
Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966) (when action for tort arises out of a contract in order
to recover there must be a breach of duty which exists apart from the contract); Am. Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 223 F.
Supp. 539 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (without privity, generally no tort action can
arise from a breach of a contractual duty); United States v. Newburg Mfg.
Co., 36 F. Supp. 602 (D. Ma. 1941) (mere "breach of contract, however deliberate or intentional, does not become a tortious wrong"); Monroe v. East
Bay Rental Serv., 111 Cal. App. 2d 574, 245 P.2d 9 (1952) (tortfeasor's liability
may arise from breach of a duty imposed by contract); Am. Express Co. v.
Arnedoe, 133 Ga. App. 437, 211 S.E.2d 392 (1974) (tort action based on contractual relation requires duty originally imposed by law); Wittke v. Horne's
Enter., Inc., 118 Ga. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 898 (1968) (contractual duty must
also be imposed by law to allow recovery based on tort); Sutker v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 648, 155 S.E.2d 694 (1967) (duty imposed by
law necessary to maintain tort action based on contractual relation);
Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 150 S.E.2d 150 (1966) (breach of contract does not allow party to sue in tort unless legal duty also imposed);
John Deer Co. of St. Louis v. Short, 378 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1964) (violation of
contract not basis for liability in tort); Helm v. Inter-Insurance Exch., 354
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those cases which permit tort recovery for negligent perform15
The
ance of contractual duty without any further tort analysis.
third category includes those cases which permit tort recovery
for negligent performance of contractual duty where the resulting harm is physical and the risk was foreseeable. 16
Mo. 935, 192 S.W.2d 417 (1946) (breach of contract constitutes tort only
"where the law casts its separate obligation"); Avesato v. Paul Tishman Co.,
142 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1955) (breach of contract not basis for damages in tort
absent violation of legal duty); Rosenbaum v. Branster Realty Corp., 276
A.D. 167, 93 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1949) (absent a violation of a legal duty, failure to
perform a contract never constitutes a tort); O'Hagan v. Del Prado, 53
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1945) (tort recovery for breach of contract only allowed upon
showing of fraud, overreaching, conversion or willful and malicious interference with contract rights); McCreech v. Howard R. Ware Corp., 53 N.Y.S.2d
192 (1945) (violation of contract not recoverable in tort where no general
duty exists); Shubitz v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, 59 Misc. 2d 732, 301
N.Y.S.2d 926 (1969) ("failure to perform contractual obligation is never a
tort unless it is also a violation of a legal duty"); Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, 207 Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1955) (generally "even an intentional breach of contract does not create tort liability"); Toone v. Adams, 262
N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964) (nonperformance of contractual duty only
constitutes tort if breach of independent legal duty also shown); Greene v.
Charlotte Chem. Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961) (omission to perform contractual obligation never constitutes tort unless it also
constitutes a legal duty); Pitts v. Southwestern Sales Corp., 179 Okla. 274, 65
P.2d 184 (1937) (when cause of action arises merely from breach of contract,
there is no tort); Kisle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 262 Or. 1, 495 P.2d
1198 (1972) ("damage solely caused by failure to perform a contract is not
recoverable in tort"); Harper v. Interstate Brewery Co., 168 Or. 26, 120 P.2d
757 (1942) (claimant may sue in tort for breach of contract only if duty was
created by law).
15. Sanderson v. Crowley, 180 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1950) (wrongful conversion arising out of breach of contract provides basis for tort recovery);
Tapley v. Yeomans, 95 Ga. App. 161, 97 S.E.2d 365 (1957) (action for a tort
may arise from a violation of a duty from a contract); Jordan v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 257 Ia. 813, 135 N.W.2d 120 (1965) (if a contract imposes a legal duty on a
person, neglect of that duty is a tort founded on contract); Green Constr.
Co. v. Williams Form Eng'g, 506 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (negligent
performance of a contract can give rise to tort liability); Trans-Carribean
Airways, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Serv. Int'l, 14 A.D.2d 749, 220 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1961) (generally, negligent performance of a contract gives rise to an action
in tort and for breach of contract); Montgomery Ward Co. v. Scharrenbeck,
146 Tex. 153, 204 S.W.2d 509 (1947) (negligent performance of a contract may
cause a tort); Coastal Constr. Co. v. Tex-Kote, Inc., 571 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) (negligent performance of a contract is a tort as well as a breach
of contract); Butler v. Lopez, 367 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (a tort
may arise from the negligent acts performed in a contract); Liles v. Winters
Indep. School Dist., 326 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (a breach of contract may be a tortious act).
16. See, e.g., Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial Plants Corp., 569
F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1977) (negligent performance of a contract may give rise to
a claim in tort); Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. Campbell, Rea, Hayes & Large, 492
F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (must exercise reasonable care even if not contractually required to do so); Abel Holding Co., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel.
Co., 147 N.J. Super. 263, 371 A.2d 111 (1977) (when party is under public duty
to exercise care, he may be held liable for his negligence); Colton v.
Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 47 N.W.2d 901 (1951) (if there is a duty created from
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The most widely followed rule is that the negligent undertaking of a contractual duty in and of itself does not constitute a
tort. A tort relationship arises only if public policy warrants the
imposition of a duty, separate and apart from contract, between
the parties. This decision is premised upon the traditional tort
determinatives: foreseeability, likelihood of injury, the nature of
the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury,
and the consequences of placing that burden upon the
defendant.
An example of this category of cases is Aspell v. American
ContractBridge League of Memphis, Tennessee,17 wherein a voluntary association of bridge players disciplined and discharged
one of its members. The discharged member brought suit for
wrongful discipline and framed the suit in tort, seeking compensation for injuries to her reputation and for punitive damages.
The court found that the relationship between the members of
the voluntary bridge association was a contractual one. 18 Hence,
the discipline and discharge of one of its members was at first a
breach of contract, and the breach would not be a tort unless the
law imposed an independent duty which existed apart from the
contract itself. The court then undertook a lengthy evaluation of
whether such a positive tort duty should be imposed and ultimately held against the discharged member. 19
Adhering to the same rule, the Georgia courts have stated:
It is axiomatic that a single act or course of conduct may constitute
not only a breach of contract but an independent tort as well, if in
addition to violating a contract obligation it also violates a duty
owed to plaintiff independent of contract to avoid harming him
....
Such an independent harm may be found because of the relationship between the parties, or because of defendant's calling or
because of the nature of the harm ....
However, not all breaches
of contract are also independent torts ....
[W]here defendant's
negligence ends merely in non-performance of the contract and
where defendant is not under any recognized duty to act apart from
the contract, the courts generally still see no duty to act affirmatively except the duty based on-and limited by--defendant's consent ....
[I]n those circumstances, an action in tort may not be
maintained for what is a mere breach through nonaction or through
ineffective performance (which is the same thing) of a contract
duty-the
duty must arise independent of contract to constitute a
20
tort.

the terms of the contract and that duty is performed negligently, it may
constitute a tort).
17. 122 Ariz. 399, 595 P.2d 191 (1979).
18. Id. at 401, 595 P.2d at 193-94.
19. Id. at 402, 595 P.2d at 194-96.
20. Travelers Ins. Co. v. King, 160 Ga. App. 473, 475, 287 S.E.2d 381, 383
(1981), quoting Orkin Ext. Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363, 203 S.E.2d 587
(1973). Both cases relied on 2 HARPER &JAMES, TORTS § 18.6 (1956). In Tray-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 17:249

A limited number of jurisdictions follow the more lenient
rule of the second category permitting virtually any negligent
performance of a contractual duty to be deemed a tort.21 Some
of these cases involve circumstances under which a tort duty
would probably be imposed under a traditional tort analysis due
to the nature of the risk and the type of injury suffered. The
courts in these cases, however, have not employed a tort analysis and have relied upon a blanket rule that negligent performance of a contract gives rise to a duty in tort.22 Moreover, many
of the other cases falling within this category have permitted
tort relief even where a traditional tort analysis would not lead
to the same result.
One such case is Tapley v. Youmans. 23 In Tapley, the court
held that a sharecropper could maintain an action against the
landlord in tort where the landlord, under contractual obligation
to lease the land to the sharecropper for a certain year, refused
to permit the sharecropper to go forward and complete the labor
essential to the cultivation and harvesting of the crops. 24 Another case permitting tort recovery without applying a traditional tort analysis is Kunzman v. Cherokee Silo Co. 25 In
Kunzman, damages were suffered because of cracks in a silo
which permitted air to enter the silo and oxidize certain grain.
The plaintiff farmer brought suit against the contractor who
built the silo. Although the question of whether a tort could be
maintained was not directly presented to the court, the court
noted:
elers, plaintiff recovered in tort when his insurance company stopped payment on a settlement check without notice to the insured, the plaintiff. The

appellate court affirmed, not because the insurance company failed to perform its duty to pay a valid claim under the insurance contract constituted
tortious negligence, but because the company's conduct constituted an independent injury, i.e., tortious interference with an existing property right.
Once the plaintiff became the named payee on the check, Georgia law rec-

ognized a property right in the check on behalf of the plaintiff. Stopping
payment without notice to the plaintiff thereby interfered with plaintiffs
property right in the check. 160 Ga. App. at 474. 287 S.E.2d at 382-84.

21. See supra note 14.
22. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Crowley, 180 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1950). In Sanderson, the court stated, "[i]t is well settled, however, that a tort may be
committed by one of the parties to a contract, either in the breach or in the

partial performance thereof. .

. ." Id.

at 127. The plaintiffs had brought a

suit against the defendants for the breach of a contract in failing to deliver

yearlings and calves in the proportion called for by the terms of the contract. Although the court found fraudulent inducement by the defendants
to pay certain sums of money, the court, in viewing the verdict, simply held
that any breach of contract was a tort. Id. at 125-28.
23. 95 Ga. App. 161, 97 S.E.2d 365 (1957).

24. Id. at 176, 97 S.E.2d at 373.
25. 253 Ia. 885, 114 N.W.2d 534 (1962).
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[A] tort may be dependent upon, or independent of, contract. If a
contract imposes a legal duty upon a person the neglect of that
duty is a tort founded on contract; so that an action ex contractu for
the breach of the contract, or an action ex delicto
for the breach of
26
duty, may be brought at the option of plaintiff.
One particularly noteworthy example of this line of cases is
Butler v. Lopez. 27 In Butler, the plaintiffs alleged, among other
things, that the defendants were liable to them in damages for
permitting certain slush pits to dry out without being filled or
restored, for not using reasonable care or diligence to minimize
the damage to land from salt water, and for permitting salt water
to run into a fresh water tank used for watering livestock. 28 The
plaintiffs, in each allegation, referred to specific contractual obligations requiring the defendants to take such actions. 29 The
court held that the actions alleged constituted a tort.30 In reaching this determination, the court reasoned:
A contract may create the state of things which furnishes the occasion of a tort. The relation which is essential to the existence of the
duty to exercise care may arise through an express or implied contract. Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness the
thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of
these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract. In
such a case, the contract is mere inducement creating the state of
things which furnishes the occasion of the tort. In other words, the
contract creates the relation out of which grows the duty to use
care. Thus, a person who contracts to make repairs can be held
liable for his negligence in doing the work.... The sound rule appears to be that where there is a general duty even though it arises
from the relation created by, or from the terms of the contract, and
that duty is violated, either by negligent performance or negligent
nonperformance,
the breach of the duty may constitute actionable
31
negligence.
Some of the cases falling within this general category draw
a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance of contrac26. Kunzman v. Cherokee Silo Co., 253 Ia. 885, 891, 114 N.W.2d 534, 537
(1962), quoting Matthys v. Donelson, 179 Ia. 1111, 1119, 160 N.W. 944, 946
(1917).
27. 367 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
28. Id. at 870-71.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 872.
31. Id. at 872 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146
Tex. 153, 156, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947)). These cases represent the position
set forth in 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 47 (1971): "As a general rule, there is
implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform it skillfully,
carefully, diligently and in a workmanlike manner, and a negligent failure
to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of contract.
Thus, a person who contracts to make repairs can be held liable for his negligence in doing the work." Id. at 395-96.
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tual obligation. 32 In cases drawing this distinction, nonfeasance
does not give rise to liability in tort. 33 Where there is misfeasance, however, such as 3negligent
performance of a contractual
4
duty, tort liability arises.
The third category of cases, represented by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, is not in accord with either of the preceding
approaches. The Restatement provides as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to
the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is35suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.
Under all three categories, physical harm to a person resulting
from negligent performance of a contract almost always is compensable in tort. It is, however, the remaining scope of the Restatement that distinguishes the third category from the
preceding two. More than mere negligent acts are required.
Foreseeability and physical harm are the keys to liability. Consideration of the additional tort determinants of likelihood of injury, nature of the risk and the like, however, are not required.
32. See

ed. 1971).

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS,

§ 92, at 614 (4th

33. Id. at 614-18.
34. See, e.g., Trans-Carribean Airways, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Serv.
Int'l, Inc., 14 A.D.2d 749, 220 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1961). In Trans-Carribean,the
court stated:
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby defendant
agreed to service and maintain plaintiffs airplane. The first cause of
action alleges breach of the agreement; the second alleges negligence in
the performance of the agreement; and the third alleges negligence and
breach of contract. The allegations of negligence include "making
faulty repair." A person undertaking to perform work is charged with
the common law duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of the work (citations omitted) ....
Negligent performance
of the work gives rise to an action in tort and for breach of contract.
Generally, failure or omission to perform the work at all is not a tort; it
may sustain an action for breach of contract for nonperformance. But
engagement upon the work, and the failure to do what was required in
the exercise of care or the alleged faulty performance on the part of the
defendant, entitles plaintiff to recover as damages the difference between the value of the airplane before and after the defendant's faulty
performance. Consequently there is present damage to the plaintiff as
well as the violation of a duty imposed by law, the combination of which
gives rise to actionable negligence.
Id. at 750-51, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87.
35.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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An example of a case which required foreseeability and
physical harm without these additional tort determinants is
Weeg v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. 36 In Weeg, the court set
forth the rule as follows:
Negligence which consists merely in the breach of a contract will
not afford ground for an action by anyone, except a party to the
contract, or a person for whose benefit the contract was avowedly
made ....
But where in omitting to perform a contract, in whole
or in part, one also omits to use ordinary care to avoid injury to
third persons, who, as he could with a slight degree of care foresee,
would be exposed to risk by his negligence, he should be held liable
to such persons
for injuries which are the proximate result of such
37
omission.
In Illinois, all three approaches have been adopted at one
time or another. 38 Therefore, the status of Illinois law remains
ambiguous. In an early case, Grandt v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. ,39 the court stated that an action in tort
may lie for a breach of duty imposed by law, independently of
any contract. 4° This would suggest that some duty beyond the
contract must be imposed to support tortious liability. In a more
recent case, Masters v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co.,41 it
was observed by the court that "the mere breach of an executory contract where there is no general duty is not the basis of
... [a tort] action." 42
Support for the second approach, premising liability on the
negligent performance of contractual obligations, can be found
in dicta in at least two Illinois cases. For instance, in Hassell v.
Sterling Federal Savings & Loan Association,43 the court commented: "Any negligence, i.e., a potential breach of duty, must
arise out of a positive duty which the law imposes because of the
existence of the contractual relationship as mortgagor and mortgagee, or because of the negligent manner in which some act the
contract provides for is done . . ... 44 In Masters, the court referred to this same rule, but enigmatically added that a mere
breach of an executory contract would not constitute a tort.45
This may be a throwback to the first category discussed above or
36. 82 S.D. 104, 141 N.W.2d 913 (1966).

37. Id. at 108, 141 N.W.2d at 916.
38. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
39. 195 Ill. App. 187 (1915).
40. Id. at 192.

41. 7 Ill.
App. 2d 348, 129 N.E.2d 586 (1955).
42. Id. at 369, 129 N.E.2d at 597.
43. 132 Ill. App. 2d 1005, 271 N.E.2d 7 (1971) (recovery of damages sought
for failure to renew fire insurance policy).
44. Id. at 1008, 271 N.E.2d at 9.
45. Masters, 7 Ill. App. 2d at 369, 129 N.E.2d at 597.
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may instead reflect the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction described previously.
The third approach has also been embraced in other Illinois
cases. The fountainhead of these cases is Norrnoyle-Berg &
Associates v. Village of Deer Creek,46 in which the relationship
of a supervising engineer to a general contractor, although noncontractual, was held to give rise to a tort duty of reasonable
care. 47 The damages suffered in Normoyle-Berg were additional
construction expenses above those originally anticipated, and
were claimed by the contractor to have resulted from the negligent supervision of the project by the defendant engineer. 48 The
court imposed the tort duty reasoning that the "supervising engineer must be held to know that a general contractor will be
involved in a project and will be directly affected by the conduct
of the engineer. ' 49 Furthermore, Normoyle-Berg is interesting
because of the absence of physical harm; the loss suffered was
only monetary. 50 Thus, Normoyle-Berg goes further than the
Restatement in imposing tort liability for negligent performance
5
of a service contract. '
46. 39 Ill. App. 3d 744, 350 N.E.2d 559 (1976).
47. Id. at 746, 350 N.E.2d at 561.
48. Id.
49. Id.

50. Id. at 745, 350 N.E.2d at 560.
51. Normoyle-Berg has been followed in at least two other cases. In
W.H. Lyman Constr. Co. v. Village of Gurnee, 84 111. App. 3d 28, 403 N.E.2d
1325 (1980), the plaintiff was a general contractor who successfully bid on a
sanitary system project. Plaintiff computed his bid on the basis of project
specifications prepared by the defendant architect. When plaintiff began
work on the project, it discovered the sewer had to be constructed through
subsurface soil that was water bearing soil and silt rather than the clay indicated by the soil borings. A high ground water table was also revealed.
Manhole equipment as designed could not be installed due to high water
pressure. Plaintiff requested approval to install the manhole equipment
under an alternative method of sealing forbid by the project plans. Approval was delayed by the defendant architects for months, causing delay
and resultant profit loss to the plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit against the
architects for negligent design, contract administration and supervision. Id.
at 30, 403 N.E.2d at 1327. This portion of the case was dismissed by the trial
court for failure to state a cause of action against the architects. Id. at 31,
403 N.E.2d at 1327. On appeal, this ruling was reversed on the basis of Normoyle-Berg Assoc., the court holding that the defendant architects owed the
plaintiff a duty of care in their design and administration of the project. Id.
at 40, 403 N.E.2d at 1334.
Another case that followed Normoyle-Berg was Bates & Rogers Constr.
Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 92 Ill. App. 3d 90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (1980).
In Bates & Rogers, the plaintiff contractor and subcontractor brought suit
against the owner and engineers of a construction project. As against the
engineers, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were guilty of negligence in designing the switchgear, in failing to cure design defects and failing to provide electrical service to the job in a timely manner, and in carelessly
preempting an important contractual relationship between plaintiffs and a
supplier, all of which allegedly resulted in cost overruns to the plaintiff. Id.
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In sum, support can be found in the law of Illinois for all
three approaches to tort liability for negligent contractual performance. Each approach conflicts with the others and the effect has been confusion and inconsistency in theory and
practice. Adopting a single rule would be desirable. Recently,
developments concerning the recovery in tort of economic loss
point toward the appropriateness of uniformity, adhering to the
first approach in determining whether tort duties should be imposed for negligent performance of service contracts.
APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE

The key to understanding the term "economic loss" is an
analysis of the cases giving rise to what might be conveniently
termed the "economic loss doctrine." 52 Economic loss is not a
particular type or element of damage so much as it is an identification of harm originating from a particular source, namely, defeated consumer expectations.
The two most prominent cases on economic loss are Santor
54
v. A & M Karagheusian,Ind.,53 and Seely v. White Motor Co.
In Santor, the plaintiff purchased carpeting which was manufactured by the defendant and sold by a third party. Shortly thereafter, lines began to appear to the carpeting. The plaintiff
brought suit against the manufacturer for the cost of the carpeting.55 Although a claim in strict liability was not alleged by the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court of New Jersey nevertheless commented that such a theory of relief would be viable under the
circumstances, despite the absence of damage to other property. 56 The court was of the opinion that the responsibility of
the manufacturer should be no different whether damages occurred solely to the article sold or whether there was also dam57
age to other property.
In Seely, the Supreme Court of California held that damages from defeated consumer expectations could not be recovat 91-92, 414 N.E.2d at 1276. The trial court dismissed the counts on the
ground that they failed to state a cause of action; that is, the engineers owed
no duty to the contractors as a matter of law. This was reversed by the

appellate court and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at
98, 414 N.E.2d at 1281. See Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1977); See also Annot. 65
A.L.R.3d 249, 256-59 (1975).
52. See also infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
53. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
54. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
55. Santor, 44 N.J. at 54, 207 A.2d at 307.
56. Id. at 58-59, 207 A.2d at 311-13.
57. Id. at 58, 207 A.2d at 312.
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ered in tort.58 The plaintiff had purchased a truck manufactured
by the defendant which overturned, possibly as a result of brake
failure. Plaintiff suffered damages to the truck and loss of profits
from an inability to use the truck. 59 The plaintiff recovered on
the warranty and the defendant appealed the judgment, arguing
that warranty had been superceded by the doctrine of strict liability.60 The court held against the defendant, expressly limiting
tort remedies to cases involving personal injury or damage to
other products. 6 1 The court rejected the Santor approach, commenting that "[0] nly if someone had been injured because the
rug was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for im'62
posing strict liability in tort.
In the court's opinion in Seely, Justice Traynor provided a
lucid exposition of the rule underlying the court's decision:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an
accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on
an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by
requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms
of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be
held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's
business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet
the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the
will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly
charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic
expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for
physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss
63
alone.
Subsequent to this decision, the economic loss issue has been
faced by a substantial number of jurisdictions, the greatest
64
number of which follow the approach taken in Seely.
The first Illinois case to consider and describe economic loss
as "economic loss" was Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler
Corp.65 At least one prior case, however, Rhodes PharmacalCo.
58. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151.
59. Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 147-48.

60. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149.
61. Id. at 15-19, 403 P.2d at 149-52.
62. Id. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
63. Id.
64. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 l.2d 69, 76-77, 86-88,
435 N.E.2d 443, 446, 451 (1982).
65. 49 Ill.
App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
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v. Continental Can Co.,66 addressed the issue implicitly. In
Rhodes Pharmacal, the plaintiff purchased cans which were
manufactured by the defendant and sold by a third party. The
purchaser filled the cans with an aerosol substance and began
distributing the cans for commercial resale. The cans thereafter
deteriorated from poor manufacture and the aerosol product
was destroyed. As a result, substantial refunds had to be made
and the purchaser's trade name suffered damage. The purchaser sought recovery in tort against the defendant for improper manufacture. The court denied recovery in tort, stating
simply that it was not persuaded that a tort remedy was
67
appropriate.
In Koplin, the plaintiff alleged that it suffered loss from the
breakdown of two air conditioning units and sought recovery in
tort. The appellate court properly viewed the case as one of economic loss and evaluated it in light of the competing schools of
thought represented by Santor and Seely. 68 Following the approach taken in Seely, the court rejected the plaintiff's tort claim
reasoning that "[t]he province of contract law is that group of
situations which involve the reasonably foreseeable commercial
expectations of purchasers and sellers. This area of law is governed by statutory law (e.g., the Uniform Commercial Code)
' 69
and the common law of contracts.
One point which remained unclear from the early Illinois
cases that addressed the issue of economic loss was the significance of physical harm. Koplin suggested that physical harm to
other property would take all of the damage outside the orbit of
7
economic loss. 70 Fireman'sFund v. Burns Electronic Security '

66. 72 Ill.
App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).

67. Id. at 368, 219 N.E.2d at 730. The court did, however, allow plaintiff a
recovery under a breach of implied warranty theory. Id. at 373, 219 N.E.2d
at 732.
68. Koplin, 49 Ill.
App. 3d at 197-204, 364 N.E.2d at 102-07.
69. Id. at 203-04, 364 N.E.2d at 107. Since the decision in Koplin, several
other Illinois cases have joined its adherence to Seely. See Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Arron Friedman, Inc., 96 Ill.
App. 3d 376, 421 N.E.2d 336 (1st
Dist. 1981) (economic loss caused by failure to perform essentially contrac-

tual duties not recoverable in tort when parties in privity of contract); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041
(1st Dist. 1981) (no remedy in tort where breach of contract causes economic losses where recovery is provided under contract); Herlihy v. Dunbar
Builders Corp., 92 Ill.
App. 3d 310, 415 N.E.2d 1224 (1st Dist. 1980) (purely
economic damages due to defects in construction not recoverable in tort).
70. Koplin, 49 Ill.
App. 3d at 203 n.11, 364 N.E.2d at 106 n.11 (construing
Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Ill.
App. 2d 297, 216
N.E.2d 282 (1965)). As this author observed in a prior article, the Koplin
example does not truly constitute economic loss. Leakage of coolant by an
air conditioner would be a peripheral hazard. Bertschy, supra note 3, at 348,
n.24 (1983).
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implied the opposite: Damage resulting from the failure of an
item to perform as expected, including damage suffered to other
property, was not recoverable in tort. "For example, if a fire
alarm fails to work and a building burns down, that is 'economic
72
loss' even though the building was physically harmed."
In the case of Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank

73
Co.,
the Supreme Court of Illinois was, for the first time,

squarely presented with the issue of economic loss. In Moorman, the plaintiff had purchased a large steel grain storage tank
manufactured by the defendant which developed a large crack
shortly after erection. Plaintiff sought to recover for its damages
in tort.74 Although this was an instance of economic loss, the
appellate court would have permitted recovery in tort.75 The appellate court rejected Koplin and its progeny, concluding that
the existence or absence of physical injury was inapposite.
Thus, the court rejected a distinction between tort and contract
theories based upon the type of harm suffered and favored an
approach which limited tort recovery only by the factors of fore76
seeability and proximate cause.
77
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.
The court discerned that the case presented only an instance of
disappointed commercial expectations, a loss for which contract
law alone provided a framework for recovery.7 8 The court defined economic loss with reference to commercial expectations:
"the defect is of a qualitative nature and the harm relates to the
consumer's expectation that a product is of a particular quality
so that it is fit for ordinary use .... ,,79 The court found that the
law of sales, as established in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), provided a thorough system governing the economic relations between buyers and sellers of goods, including those situations where commercial expectations were frustrated. 80 The
rules of warranty prevented a manufacturer from being held liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope, whereas if a
defendant was held liable in tort for commercial loss, the defendant "would be liable for business losses of other purchasers
71.
72.
73.
74.

93 Ill.
App. 3d at 298, 417 N.E.2d at 131 (1980).
Id. at 300, 417 N.E.2d at 133.
91 Ill.
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
Id.
75. Moorman Mfg. Co.v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill.
App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d
1302 (1980).
76. Id. at 138-47, 414 N.E.2d at 1306-11.
77. Moorman, 91 Ill.
2d at 94-95, 435 N.E.2d at 454-55.
78. Id. at 85-91, 435 N.E.2d at 450-53.
79. Id. at 88, 435 N.E.2d at 451.
80. Id. at 78-80, 435 N.E.2d at 447-48.
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caused by the failure of the product to meet the specific needs of
their business, even though these needs were communicated
only to the dealer." 81 Moreover, theories of action based upon
the unreasonably dangerous nature of a product (strict liability)
had little relevance when neither personal injury nor property
damage was involved.82 Thus, where the plaintiff's losses were
merely a commercial loss of the type that the law of warranty
was designed to protect, recovery would be limited to contract.
The supreme court defined economic loss in the context of
commercial expectations. It suggested that there was a definite
83
line which could be drawn between contract and tort cases.
The court attenuated the strength of these comments, however,
by recognizing that the nature of the defect, the type of the risk
and the manner in which the damage arose were factors in determining whether a tort remedy would be appropriate. 84 Thus,
the court held that where there was a sudden or calamitous loss,
a tort recovery was appropriate. 85 A serious risk of harm to people and property was thereby presented. Where the damage
suffered was merely a commercial loss arising from a qualitative
defect, however, and the harm related solely to the consumer's
expectations that the product was of a particular quality, the
86
court held that recovery was to be limited to contract.
Shortly after the decision in Moorman, the supreme court
again had occasion to consider the economic loss issue in
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf.87 In Redarowicz, the plaintiff was the
second consumer purchaser of a home constructed by the defendant. Plaintiff complained that he had suffered loss because
the wall and chimney began moving away from the rest of the
house due to negligent construction. The court refused to permit plaintiff to maintain a suit in tort against the defendant,
characterizing plaintiff's loss as economic loss which was unrecoverable in tort.R8 Redarowicz is of particular significance here
because the plaintiff and defendant were not in privity and recovery was denied even though the UCC would not have
applied. 89
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

79, 435 N.E.2d at 447.
77, 435 N.E.2d at 446-47.
81, 88, 435 N.E.2d at 448, 451.
82-85, 435 N.E.2d at 449-50.

85. Id. Justice Simon in his concurrence described these losses in helpful terms: "[hiazards peripheral to the product's function." Id. at 97, 435
N.E.2d at 455 (Simon, J., concurring).

86. Id. at 85-86, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
87. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
88. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 176-78, 441 N.E.2d at 326-27.
89. Id. at 176-78, 441 N.E.2d at 326-27. Since Redarowicz, Illinois courts

have rendered several other decisions concerning economic loss. See Fox-
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UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC LOSS

Unfortunately, few cases involving economic loss truly exhibit an understanding of that concept. The term "economic
loss" does not specify an element of loss. Instead, it specifies
losses originating in a particular source; namely, qualitative defects which defeat commercial expectations. Economic loss is
not simply a loss of profits or similar intangible loss, nor merely
the costs of replacement. These items of damage are frequently
recovered in tort actions.
The existence or absence of physical harm is also not a controlling element in determining whether damage is economic
loss. This point was recognized by Illinois Supreme Court Justice Simon in his special concurrence in Moorman:
There is no fundamental reason to define economic loss primarily
as the absence or opposite of physical harm. The appellate court
opinion in this case demonstrates at length the illogical results of
the no-physical-harm approach, especially if combined with the
view that once there is any physical harm, all damages are recover-

able, including those that would be considered economic loss when
not accompanied by the physical harm. Physical harm should not
guarantee recovery, and the absence of physical harm should not
necessarily defeat recovery. For example, if an oven malfunctions
and has to be repaired or replaced, that is clearly economic loss; if
the roast inside is burned to a crisp (physical harm), should that
make all the losses recoverable? ....
II] f a product simply fails to
live up to its promise, if it does not accomplish what it was supposed to the way it was supposed to, that is only an invasion of a
contract-like interest: the user has lost the benefit of his bargain. If

a refrigerator fails, the food inside may spoil, but
there is no tort
90
...the only risk is to commercial expectations.
croft Townhome Owners Ass'n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 96 Ill. 2d 150, 449
N.E.2d 125 (1983) (allegedly defective siding leading to premature deteriorations-no recovery in tort); Black, Jackson & Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc.
v. International Business Mach. Corp., 109 Ill. App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 282
(1982) (computer purchaser suffered lost profits, salary, office supplies, accounting and legal expenses when computer system failed to properly function-no recovery in tort). See also Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical

Laboratories, 712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1983) (lost business or profits from
blocked access to plaintiffs business-no recovery in tort). Although the
author does not think Dundee was truly an economic loss case, it was ana-

lyzed as such. Cf. Maxfield v. Simmons, 96 Ill. 2d 81, 449 N.E.2d 110 (1983)
(contractor could have cause of action for an implied right of indemnity or
contribution if the alleged tortious conduct by supplier and manufacturer

caused problem); Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Greengard Assoc., 119 Ill. App. 3d
376, 456 N.E.2d 635 (1983) (lost profits arising from negligent design and construction of a storm and surface water removal by professional engineers
not recoverable in tort); Baughn v. General Motors Corp., 118 111. App. 3d
201, 454 N.E.2d 740 (1983) (brake failure caused by sudden and dangerous
occurrence is recoverable in tort).
90. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 95-96, 435 N.E.2d at 455 (Simon, J., concurring).
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The touchstone of economic loss is a qualitative defect
which defeats consumer expectations, and the underpinnings of
the economic loss doctrine are fundamentally sound. A simple
example is illustrative. Assume two dolls, one made in an average quality production shop in this country and the other a
poorly made foreign import. Assume further that the average
quality doll carries a price tag of $19.95; the other, a price tag of
$5.95. If the poor quality doll begins to fray at the seams and
lose its stuffing before the average quality doll, would an action
in tort lie against the manufacturer and retailer of the cheaper
doll? Quite clearly not. The law imposes no general duty. This
is simply a case of qualitative defect defeating consumer expectations. In other words, economic loss.
The example can be enlarged. Assume the construction of
two identical homes by two different contractors. One charges
$100,000 for his work; the other charges $60,000. Several years
later the $60,000 home shows evidence of aging in a much more
dramatic fashion than the $100,000 home; the paint is fading, the
brick mortar is falling out and/or the concrete is settling unequally. Does an action lie here in tort? This query might give
greater pause than the doll example above, but the result should
be the same. The defect is a qualitative one that has an impact
on consumer expectations. If tort liability is imposed, how could
damages be calculated? Clearly, the purchaser of the $60,000
home should not be put in the same place as the purchaser of
the $100,000 home. Under similar circumstances, the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorft' declined to permit
92
recovery in tort.
It might be argued that the missing element in the above
examples is an objective standard (for a $5.95 doll or $60,000
home) and that, once such a standard is established, tort can be
a viable theory of recovery. This argument overlooks the fact
that the parties themselves, in their contract, have specified the
standard which will apply between them (for example, through
the existence or absence of a warranty) and it voids their expec91. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
92. Id. at 176, 441 N.E.2d at 327. Redarowicz concerned poor construction that resulted in an accelerated deterioration of a house. One of the
arguments made against the imposition of tort was the difficulty of ascertaining an appropriate standard of care. Id. at 177-78, 441 N.E.2d at 327. For
instance, the question was raised as to whether a contractor building a

lower cost home should be penalized for using lesser strength mortar or

lower quality lumber than another contractor. The plaintiff, seeking to impose the tort duty, argued that the cause of action should be permitted if a

standard of care could be established through the evidence. The court re-

jected this argument without comment. Id. at 176. 441 N.E.2d at 326.
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tations entirely to institute new and different standards after the
fact.
The heart of the economic loss doctrine is this: where the
only harm suffered is to consumer expectations and the loss
originates in a qualitative defect, a tort remedy will not lie. As
indicated below, this has substantial implications for a tort
cause of action for negligent performance of contractual
obligations.
Is ECONoMIc Loss

EVER RECOVERABLE IN TORT?

In the course of its opinion in Moorman, the Supreme Court
of Illinois commented, at several points, that economic loss was
not recoverable in tort.93 Moorman has been criticized for these
statements, as well as for its intimations that a line could be
drawn between contract4 and tort, and that those theories of re9
lief were incompatible.
The Moorman opinion implicitly admits to the importance
of conducting a tort analysis in the economic loss context. The
opinion emphasizes the significance of examining three factors
in determining whether a cause of action in tort would be appropriate: (1) the nature of the defect which caused the damages;
(2) the type of risk posed; and (3) the manner in which the damage arose. 95 These factors constitute a part of the traditional tort
analysis described above. 96 The court in Moorman evaluated
97
the facts presented in that case against these three factors.
Thus, although some of the court's comments are to the contrary, Moorman can be viewed as a case which involved an implicit tort analysis of a particular loss and which determined
that there was no duty arising on its facts.
There is no valid reason for drawing a line of demarcation
between contract and tort as if they are competing theories of
law. Contract and tort are commonly found to exist on the same
facts. The key is whether, in a contractual context, the factors
giving rise to a tort are also present. This is the significance of
the supreme court's review of the facts in Moorman against the
traditional tort standards.
It is particularly significant that the supreme court, in the
course of its opinion in Moorman, specifically identified two
93. Moorman, 91 El. 2d at 81, 88, 91, 95, 435 N.E.2d at 448, 451, 453, 455.
94. See Bertschy, supra note 3, at 350. The discussion following was first
broached in this article.
95. Moorman, 91111. 2d at 85, 435 N.E.2d at 449-50 (quoting Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1981).
96. See supra note 5.
97. Moorman, 91 111. 2d at 85-86, 435 N.E.2d at 450.

19841

Economic Loss Doctrine

prior cases of economic loss where recovery was permitted in
tort. One of these cases, Rozny v. Marnul,98 is a particularly
helpful illustration of the recovery of economic loss in tort. In
Rozny, plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant, a surveyor,
for the surveyor's preparation of an inaccurate survey. That survey had been prepared by the defendant several years before for
a different party than the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs obtained the survey and relied upon it in situating and constructing a garage on
their property. After the garage was constructed, it was found to
encroach on neighboring property due to improper location of
the garage in reliance upon the inaccurate survey. 99
The loss suffered by the plaintiffs was clearly economic loss.
It was so described by the supreme court in Moorman and it was
the result of a qualitative defect which defeated consumer expectations: the survey did not do what it was intended to do,
that is, reveal the true boundaries of the property. 10 0 Nevertheless, the supreme court, in Rozny, permitted recovery in tort because of certain special factors present in that case:
(1) The express, unrestricted and wholly voluntary "absolute
guarantee for accuracy" appearing on the face of the inaccurate
plat;
(2) [dlefendant's knowledge that this plat would be used and relied on by others than the person ordering it, including plaintiffs;
(3) [t] he fact that potential liability in this case is restricted to a
comparatively small group, and that, ordinarily, only one member
of that group will suffer loss;
(4) [tjhe absence of proof that copies of the corrected plat were
delivered to any one;
(5) [tjhe undesirability of requiring an innocent reliant party to
carry the burden of a surveyor's professional mistake;
(6) [t]hat recovery here by a reliant user whose ultimate use was
foreseeable
will promote cautionary techniques among
10 1
surveyors.

Accordingly, despite some of the statements in Moorman,
economic loss is recoverable in tort where public policy considerations warrant the imposition of a social duty. There must be
a showing of harm beyond mere disappointed expectations, as
in Rozny. There is no absolute bar, however, prohibiting the re98. 43 Ill.
2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
99. Id. at 56-58, 250 N.E.2d at 657-58.

100. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 89, 435 N.E.2d at 452. The Supreme Court referred to the loss in Rozny as an intangible economic interest. Id. It was an
"economic loss" because the survey had a qualitative defect (it failed to
identify lot lines as it was intended) and this defect defeated commercial

expectations in the survey.
101. Rozny, 43 Ill. 2d at 67-68, 250 N.E.2d at 663. The other case mentioned
in Moorman in which economic loss would be recoverable under a tort theory was Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 282, 402 N.E.2d 599 (1980),
which involved intentional misrepresentation.
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covery of economic loss in tort where such a showing can be
made.
APPLICATION TO SERVICE CONTRACTS

The legal analysis of economic loss to date has primarily occurred in the context of products. Theoretically, however, the
principles apply equally to service contracts. Economic loss refers to qualitative defects which impair consumer expectations.
Just as in the case of qualitative defects in products, qualitative
defects in services can defeat the purchaser's commercial expectations. For example, a negligent, careless and mistake-ridden performance by a renowned pianist defeats the commercial
expectations of those who paid $25.00 for a ticket to view the performance. If the only harm suffered is that of defeated commercial expectations, the same reasons which justify barring tort
recovery in the products context compel denying tort relief respecting services. Certainly a suit against the careless pianist
could not be maintained in tort. Tort law does not protect consumer expectations, and there is no basis for applying this rule
to products and not to services.
Although one Illinois appellate court has declined to extend
the principles of economic loss to the performance of contractual services, the decision predated Moorman and was premised
on the inapplicability of the economic loss doctrine outside the
area of products liability.10 2 The Illinois Supreme Court has
now ruled that the economic loss doctrine applies outside the
products area and has explicitly applied the principles of economic loss to realty, barring recovery for negligent construction
of a residence in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf.10 3 Moreover, Moorman itself referred favorably to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals case Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.,o4 which applied the doctrine of economic loss to prohibit
recovery in tort for negligent performance of contractual
105
services.
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the plaintiff brought a suit
against Johns-Manville arising from a defective roofing system.
102. Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 92 Ill.
App. 3d 90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (1980). For a discussion of Bates & Rogers, see

supra note 51.
103. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982). In extending Moorman to the
facts of the case, the supreme court made no comment about applying the
doctrine outside of the products field.
104. 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
105. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 83, 435 N.E.2d
443, 449-50 (1982), citing Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville
Sales, Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Johns-Manville had been retained by the plaintiff to recommend
and supply suitable roofing materials. After being briefed on the
design of the roof and informed of the weather conditions in the
area surrounding the building, a representative of JohnsManville recommended a specific type of roof because of its durability and ease of repair. The representative further suggested
a particular type of insulation because it could withstand the uplift caused by extremely high winds, was virtually waterproof
and had outstanding dimensional stability. The plaintiff accepted these recommendations and included the roofing system
in the architectural plans for the plant. 10 6 Shortly after the roof
was completed, the roof began to blister, wrinkle and crack.
This permitted water to enter into the plaintiff's mill, which in
turn damaged some of the steel products under construction
and caused electrical problems. Thereafter, portions of the roof
began to tear away and, on several occasions, winds at high
speeds below that which the roof was designed to withstand
07
blew off portions of the roof.
The plaintiff obtained judgment against Johns-Manville on
four separate tort theories: (1) strict liability for defects in the
roofing product; (2) strict liability for defects in the design of the
roof; (3) strict liability for public misrepresentation regarding
the roofing product; and (4) negligent performance of an undertaking to render services. 10 8 On appeal, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment. 10 9 The Third Circuit applied
a choice of law analysis and determined that it would adhere to
the law in Illinois.11 ° The court perceived the issue as one of
economic loss. Though Moorman had not been decided, the
court correctly forecast that the Supreme Court of Illinois would
follow the Seely v. White Motor Co. "1 line of cases. 112 Examining the judgment in light of the economic loss doctrine, the
113
Third Circuit held that no recovery could be obtained in tort.
Unfortunately, Jones & Laughlin did not specifically address the application of the economic loss doctrine to negligent
contractual performance. Yet implied in the Third Circuit's decision was that the doctrine was applicable to service contracts.
106. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 626 F.2d at 282. During the construction of
the roof itself, Johns-Manville supervised the insulation work which was

actually performed by roofing contractors.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 283.
109. Id. at 281.
110. Id. at 283-84.
111. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
112. Jones & Laughlin, 626 F.2d at 287 n.13.

113. Id. at 289-90.
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One of the independent bases of the judgment was "negligent
performance of an undertaking to render services." 1 14 To reverse the judgment in full, the court necessarily found that this
specific cause of action was nonrecoverable in tort.
A recent Illinois appellate court case has also applied the
economic loss doctrine in a context which principally involved
service contracts. In PalatineNationalBank v. GreengardAssociates,1 5 the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for
negligent performance of a contract. With respect to negligence,
the complaint alleged that the plaintiff had entered into a written agreement with the defendant requiring the defendant to
provide professional engineering services, including the design
of a system to dispose of storm and surface water from real estate as well as the calculation of grading requirements for different phases of the project. The plaintiff alleged that it thereby
became the duty of the defendant to use the degree of care and
skill usually and customarily followed by other engineers in
similar circumstances, that the defendant failed to exercise such
care and skill and that the plaintiff suffered damages when the
storm and surface water system failed. 16 The appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of the tort count noting that
[i]t is now settled in Illinois that when a defect of a product is of a
qualitative nature and the alleged harm relates to the consumer's
expectation that the product is of a particular quality resulting in
solely economic injury, without personal injury of other property
1 17
damage, the appropriate remedy lies in contract, and not tort.
The distinction between product and service is a nebulous
one at best and almost totally nonexistent when viewed in the
context of commercial expectations. Consider, for example, the
purchase of a new car which, when delivered to the customer
from the dealer, is discovered to have "drips" in the paint finish
on the left rear door. A tort cause of action would not be the
appropriate remedy for the loss in value of the car. Next, consider the contrasting example of a car owner who contracts to
have his car painted and the car is returned to him with "drips"
in the paint finish on the left rear door. Should this owner be
114. Id. at 282.

App. 3d 376, 456 N.E.2d 635 (1983).
115. 119 Ill.
116. Id. at 377, 456 N.E.2d at 637.
117. Id. at 379, 456 N.E.2d at 638 (citations omitted). Although the author

agrees that Palatine National Bank was properly viewed as an instance of
economic loss, he believes the opinion can be criticized for failing to consider wether such economic loss would be recoverable in tort. For example,
Rozny, involving negligence by a surveyor, was an example of economic

loss but recovery was permitted in tort because of the particular public pol-

icy considerations involved. PalatineNational Bank does not contain such
an analysis.
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permitted any other remedy than the car purchaser above? Any
distinction in remedies between these two cases would be indefensible. Both involve the same type of loss, defeated consumer expectations, and neither is appropriate for a recovery in
tort.
One of the difficult questions in the application of the economic loss doctrine to service contracts is whether privity is required to apply the principles of economic loss. The Supreme
Court of Illinois, although it did not explicitly comment on the
issue, applied the economic loss doctrine absent privity in
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf.n 8 Redarowicz can be distinguished,
however, because the parties were in the chain of ownership of
the home, a concept foreign to service contracts.
The question of privity can be resolved by referring to the
underlying theory of the economic loss doctrine: qualitative defects that defeat consumer expectations are not recoverable in
tort. In the case of service contracts, the qualitative defect is the
defective performance of a contract. Hence, the economic loss
doctrine should be held applicable to the negligence of any
party who is performing a duty in which the plaintiff has a contractual expectation." 9 For example, negligent performance by
a subcontractor which causes loss to the owner is economic loss
even though the owner and subcontractor have no contract. The
work that the subcontractor is doing is derived from a contractual expectation the owner has with the general contractor. The
"chain of ownership" applicable to the Redarowicz context,
could be termed the "chain of contractual responsibility" in the
service context. Therefore, from a theoretical and practical
standpoint, the principles of the economic loss doctrine must be
applicable to the negligent performance of service contracts.
Where the only harm and loss is to contractual expectations, recovery in tort should be denied.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE ON

RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF SERVICE

CONTRACTS
The economic loss doctrine carries significant implications
for tort recovery for negligent performance of service contracts.
The cases involving tort recovery arising out of contractual performance can be placed into three basic categories: (1) cases
permitting a tort recovery only after a traditional tort analysis
2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 524 (1982).
118. 92 Ill.
119. The author poses the following question: If the application of the
economic loss doctrine required privity, would the other side of this rule be
that tort damages could be recovered only absent privity?
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finds that a positive tort duty exists under the circumstances;
(2) cases permitting a tort recovery for mere negligent performance of a contractual duty; and (3) cases permitting a tort recovery for negligent performance of a contractual duty where the
resulting harm is physical and the risk is foreseeable. Evaluated in light of the principles of economic loss, only the first category presents an appropriate basis for imposing tort liability
for negligent performance of a service contract.
The first category requires the finding of a positive duty
outside the contract before tort liability will be established.
This duty may arise from the contract or from the partial performance of the contract, as in the case of professional malpractice or where a partial performance presents a substantial risk
of harm to the public. The duty, however, is not founded solely
on defeated consumer expectations. Instead, the duty is based
on public policy, an analysis which considers foreseeability,
likelihood of injury, the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the
burden of guarding against injury and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant.
Rozny v. Marnul 20 is illustrative of the above principle. In
Rozny, the surveyor's responsibility originated in contract. As
conceded by the Illinois Supreme Court, the damage suffered by
the plaintiffs was economic loss. Nevertheless, plaintiffs could
recover their damages in tort because of the public policy considerations which warranted imposition of a tort duty.
Thus, the first category of negligent performance cases falls
squarely within the body of law which has evolved around the
principle of economic loss. Damages suffered by reason of negligent performance of contracts are qualitative defects impacting
upon contractual expectations. Such damages are therefore
nonrecoverable in tort unless public policy warrants the imposition of a social duty.
The second category, permitting tort recovery for mere negligent performance of a contract, does not comport with the doctrine of economic loss. Failure to perform a contract, whether it
consists of a complete failure to perform or partial performance,
is only a failure to meet contractual requirements. The contractual requirements of one party are the contractual expectations
of the other party. Failure by one party to satisfy its contractual
requirements thus defeats the contractual expectations of the
other party. Defeated contractual expectations are precisely
that type of damage which the principle of economic loss holds
120. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
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to be unrecoverable in tort. 12 1 The second category of cases
would establish the appropriate rule only if all contractual requirements were to be accepted as imposing public policy duties. In order to accept this position, the traditional tort analysis
122
would have to be abandoned.
Moreover, if mere negligent performance of a contract
presented a cause of action in tort, it would necessarily follow
that an intentional breach of contract would constitute a tort. In
Illinois, however, one may intentionally breach a contract with
impunity (although he will be liable for contract damages).123
The nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction relied upon in
some of the cases placed in the second category 124 fails to reconcile these cases with the economic loss doctrine. Whether the
action of the defendant is a complete failure to act or a negligent
failure to perform properly, the result is still a qualitative defect
which defeats contractual expectations. The qualitative defect
is the flawed performance; a performance of lesser grade than
what was desired. The result is a loss of contractual expectations. The "why" of the low quality performance resulting in the
loss of expectations is irrelevant.
Additionally, the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction cannot lead to a rule of uniform application. There are instances
where nonfeasance itself will give rise to a tort. A good example
is where a surgeon is retained to perform an appendectomy. A
complete failure to perform the appendectomy would certainly
be a tort.
The third category of cases falls under the principles of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, imposing tort liability for negligent contractual performance where there is physical harm and
the risk of such harm is foreseeable at the time of the contractual undertaking. 125 Like the second category, this third standard also fails when scrutinized under the principles of
economic loss. The keys to the Restatement approach are foreseeability and physical harm.
121. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Il.2d 69, 88, 435
N.E.2d 443, 451 (1982).
122. If the law were to adopt the position that all contractual breaches
were torts, there would be no need to examine foreseeability, likelihood of
injury, the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against injury, and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant. Any traditional tort analysis, thus would be obviated.
123. Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 350,
408 N.E.2d 1041, 1050 (1980).
124. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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The Restatement first looks to what risks were foreseeable
at the time of the contractual undertaking. Economic loss, defeated commercial expectations, is foreseeable damage at the
time of contracting and thereby in all cases satisfies the first criteria under the Restatement. 126 The "physical harm" criteria is
somewhat restrictive but even this criteria fails to square the
Restatement in its entirety with the economic loss doctrine. The
existence of physical harm does not in and of itself withdraw a
case from the economic loss category. Justice Simon, in his concurrence in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank
Co. ,127 recognized that the presence or absence of physical harm
did not define the boundaries of economic loss. Justice Simon
commented:
There is no fundamental reason to define economic loss primarily
as the absence or opposite of physical harm. The appellate court
opinion in this case demonstrates at length the illogical results of
the no-physical-harm approach .... Physical harm should not

guarantee recovery, and the absence of physical harm should not
necessarily defeat recovery ....
[I]f a product simply fails to live up to its promise, if it does not
accomplish what it was supposed to the way it was supposed to,
that is only an invasion of a contract-like interest: the user has lost
the benefit of the bargain. If a refrigerator fails, the food inside may
spoil but there is no tort ....
expectations .... 128

[T] he only risk is to commercial

The Illinois cases that might be placed within this third category do not involve physical harm. They impose liability solely
on the factor of foreseeability. In Normoyle-Berg Associates v.
Village of Deer Creek,129 a supervising engineer was held liable
to a general contractor for cost overruns suffered as a result of
the supervising engineer's negligence. The court held that a supervising engineer would be held to have known that a general
contractor would be involved and directly affected by the engi126. The foreseeability criteria is nothing more than a restatement of the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The fact
that damages are foreseeable at the time of undertaking does not compel
the imposition of tort. If this were so, all contract cases would be tort cases.
Defeated contractual expectations would be recoverable in tort as a matter
of course. Indeed, these points have been recognized in the "foreseeability"
tests rejected in the 1977 Illinois case of Laflin v. Estate of Mills, 53 Ill. App.
3d 29, 368 N.E.2d 522 (1977). Moreover, foreseeability is not the sum total of
the traditional tort determinates. Foreseeability is not a gage of the likelihood of injury, the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury or the consequence of placing the burden upon the
defendant. If the Restatement approach was adopted, it would abandon the
tort analysis traditionally used in resolving the imposition of public policy
duties.
127. 91 Ill.
2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
128. Id. at 95-96, 435 N.E.2d at 455 (Simon, J., concurring).
App. 3d 744, 350 N.E.2d 559 (1976).
129. 39 Ill.
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neer's conduct. 130 In W.H. Lyman Construction Co. v. Village of
3 a supervising engineer was found to
Gurnee,'1
have a tort duty
to a contractor to avoid negligent preparation of specifications
and negligent contract administration.13 2 The court once again

looked to foreseeability. 133 In Bates & Rogers Construction v.
North Shore SanitaryDistrict134 the engineer was held to have a

duty to a contractor to avoid negligent design and administra13 5
tion of the project; once again on the basis of foreseeability.
Each of these cases involved economic loss. The harm suffered
by the plaintiffs, additional costs of construction due to delays
and mistakes resulting in a reduction of profits, defeated the
commercial expectations of the plaintiffs.
In the aftermath of Moorman, the methodology explicitly
utilized to impose tort liability in these three cases was in error.
If correct, such precedent would compel the imposition of a tort
duty upon the contractor of a residential home to build the
home in a non-negligent fashion, because it would be entirely
foreseeable that negligent construction methods might cause
severe financial harm to the owner. This, however, was the factual situation presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf,3

6

wherein the court held that there

1 37
was no tort duty requiring non-negligent construction.
In sum, it is solely the first categorization of the tort-contract overlap cases, holding that tort liability can be imposed for
negligent performance of a service contract only where traditional tort determinants are satisfied, which is consistent with
the economic loss doctrine. The remaining categories embrace
rules which would permit tort recovery in cases solely involving
economic loss. With the advent of the economic loss line of
138
cases, such relief is no longer appropriate.

130. Id. at 746, 350 N.E.2d at 561.
131. 84 Ill. App. 3d 28, 403 N.E.2d 1325 (1980).
132. Id. at 39-40, 403 N.E.2d at 1333-34.
133. Id.
134. 92 Ill. App. 3d 90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (1980).
135. Id. at 96-97, 414 N.E.2d at 1279-80.
136. 92 Ill.
2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
137. Id. at 176-78, 441 N.E.2d at 326-27.
138. It has been the law in Illinois that there is an implied obligation in
every construction contract that the contractor will perform his tasks in a
workmanlike fashion. Wiersema v. Workman Plumbing, Heating & Cooling,
Inc., 87 Ill. App. 3d 535, 409 N.E.2d 159 (1980); Dean v. Rutherford, 49 Ill. App.
3d 768, 364 N.E.2d 625 (1977). This introduces a standard of care into the
construction contract which is identical to that which would be imposed if
tort was applicable. Nevertheless, the duty is derived from an implied contract, not tort. Could it be that the similarity in standards and terminology
has led to the confusion and leniency in permitting tort remedies in such
situations?
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CONCLUSION

The status of the law in Illinois concerning tort recovery for
negligent performance of contracts is ambiguous. Cases can
generally be placed into three categories: (1) those cases which
permit tort recovery only where an independent tort duty can be
established; (2) those cases which permit tort recovery for any
negligent performance of contract; and (3) those cases which
permit tort recovery for negligent performance of contract only
where the risk of harm was foreseeable at the time of undertaking the contract.
The recent development of the economic loss doctrine in Illinois is theoretically applicable to service contracts. Evaluated
in light of the principles of economic loss, only those cases
where a tort duty can be established independent of contract
present proper cases for permitting recovery for negligent performance of contract in tort. Permitting tort relief in cases falling within the other two categories would lead to results which
would be entirely inconsistent with the theories behind contract
and tort causes of action.

